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This paper characterises income poverty in Honduras during the first half of 2007, and assesses 
the impact that some government transfers have had on it. The characterisation of income 
poverty shows that it is possible to eradicate poverty in Honduras solely through 
redistribution, despite its being a low-income country. The analysis of the incidence and 
impact of government transfers reveals that they do reach the poor, but that they are not very 
effective in reducing the poverty headcount ratio or in alleviating poverty by reducing its 
intensity and severity. Nonetheless, the counterfactual simulations presented here show that 
improvements in targeting and increases in the amount transferred could significantly 
enhance the impact of government transfers on poverty in Honduras. 
1  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years the Honduran government has been spending 7–9 per cent of GDP on the 
programmes that comprise its poverty reduction strategy.1 Some of these programmes involve 
direct cash and/or in-kind transfers to the poor, and thus it is assumed that their impact on 
poverty can be assessed. This paper’s main goal is to characterise income poverty in Honduras 
in the first half of 2007, and to assess how it is affected by some of these transfers. A secondary 
goal is to simulate alternative scenarios in order to examine whether changes such as 
improvements in targeting and/or increases in the amount transferred could bring about 
greater poverty reduction and alleviation. 
We will not consider the features of each transfer programme here, nor the challenges they 
face. Some of the transfers are currently in jeopardy. This is the case, for instance, of transfers that 
are conditional on low electricity consumption and are channelled through the national 
electricity company. The latter is facing financial problems because of the rising price of oil, since 
a significant part of the country’s electricity supply comes from thermoelectric plants.2 
Honduras’s conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme, probably the first one 
implemented in Latin America in the early 1990s, has faced many sustainability problems 
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throughout its history, as evidenced by Moore’s comprehensive description of it (Moore, 2008). 
It is also important to bear in mind that the programme was expanded and redesigned in mid 
2007, and thus its current effects  on poverty might differ from those presented herein. As this 
paper was being completed, the results of the second round of the Honduran national 
household survey were released. Since the survey is conducted in September, however, and 
since the reference period for non-labour income is three months before the survey, it is 
unlikely that it will detect all the effects of the programme’s expansion on poverty. Hence an 
assessment of the poverty impact of that expansion must await the findings of the survey 
round in the first half of 2008. Otherwise there is a risk of underestimating the effectiveness 
of the changes to the programme. 
This paper does not examine the institutional problems that the programme faced in 2007 
or the changes it underwent. It focuses on the amounts transferred and their impact on 
poverty in the first half of that year. 
To that end the paper is divided into five sections, including this introduction. The next 
section briefly describes the national household survey from which all the data in the paper are 
drawn, and explains in detail how the survey collects information on household income. 
The third section explains the methodology used to measure the impact that some of the 
cash and in-kind transfers had on poverty, and to conduct the alternative- scenario simulations 
designed to explore whether the impact could be greater than observed. Essentially, the 
method consists of calculating poverty measures for income distribution net of transfers, and 
comparing them with those for the distribution including transfers. The alternative scenarios 
are counterfactual simulations in which the transfers are better targeted or are larger. 
The fourth section presents the results, starting with a description of poverty and the 
observed impact of government transfers on it, and then moving to the alternative scenario 
simulations. Our description of poverty leads us to conclude that, in an optimistic scenario, 
poverty in Honduras can be eradicated through redistribution. Regarding government 
transfers, the main conclusions are that they do reach the poor but (since they are small and 
rather uniformly distributed among the poor) they do little to alleviate poverty, although they 
enable some of the least poor to cross the poverty line. The simulations show that even if the 
amount transferred does not increase, poverty alleviation would be greater if the transfers 
were targeted at the extremely poor.  
The final section summarises the findings and presents some policy options to enhance 
the impact of government transfers on poverty. 
2  DATA 
The data in this study come from the May 2007 round of the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares 
de Propósitos Múltiples (EPHPM), a national household survey conducted twice a year. This two-
stage sample survey is conducted by the National Statistical Institute (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística, INE). Its sample comprised 21,606 households, which can be considered fairly large 
given the size of the population. The publicly distributed datasets include the variables that 
record the answers to the questionnaires, as well as those constructed by INE to calculate some 
of the poverty indicators disseminated by the Honduran government and used as part of the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Information System (Sistema de Información de la Estrategia para la 
Reducción de la Pobreza, SIERP). Rafael Guerreiro Osório  3 
 
In the EPHPM, income is an individual attribute divided into two components: labour and 
non-labour. Labour income consists of the earnings of a person who worked in the production 
of goods and services for the market or for self-consumption. The earnings may be monetary 
or in-kind, in which case a monetary value is given to the goods or services received or 
consumed. Non-labour income consists of pensions, private transfers, capital earnings and 
government transfers. Some income components can be recorded in US dollars. The dataset 
contains the exchange rate used to convert values in dollars to lempiras: US$ 1 = L$ 19.03. 
Herein this exchange rate has been used to calculate all figures presented in US dollars. 
It is worth mentioning that the income data in the May 2007 EPHPM is of very high 
quality, which was not the case in previous rounds of the survey. Only 344 observations  
had to be removed from the dataset. These were in households whose income could not be 
computed: 34 because of missing values; three because the in-kind income from agricultural 
activity of a worker in the household exceeded L$ 8 million (more than US$ 420,000); and the 
rest because of identification problems that arose when the non-labour income dataset was 
merged with the population dataset. The sample size was thus reduced to 99,432 observations 
of individuals in 21,555 households, a loss of only 51 households. 
2.1  LABOUR INCOME 
A working person was defined as someone who had been producing goods or services for the 
market or for self-consumption for at least one hour “last week” (INE, 2007). If a person worked 
for pay or as unremunerated worker, or was temporarily away from a job because of leave or 
sickness, a series of questions sought to characterise the job, such as by occupation and 
industry. The labour section of the questionnaire applied only to household members who 
were five or more years old. 
The wage workers were asked how frequently they were paid (daily, weekly, twice a 
month or monthly), how many periods they worked “last month” and how much they were 
paid per period. They were also asked whether they received cash or in-kind payments besides 
a wage (such as food, clothing/footwear, housing, transport, commissions, bonuses, tips, extra 
hours or some other payment). If they did, they were asked to estimate the monthly value of 
the goods or services received.  
If employers or self-employed workers were not agricultural producers, they were asked 
to state their average monthly earnings in the “last six months”. If they had consumed their 
own products or services, they were asked to estimate the average monthly monetary value of 
such consumption in the “last six months”.  
If employers or self-employed workers were agricultural producers, they were asked 
questions about their production in the “last 12 months”.3 There was a set of questions about 
sales of livestock and their by-products, and another set about sales of crops. The questions on 
crops included an estimate of production costs, but there was no such estimate for livestock 
and by-products. Both sets included questions on personal consumption. The crop farmers’ 
earnings could be negative, since production costs could be higher than the sale price of the 
crop plus self-consumption. This was not computed: producers with negative income were 
marked as having zero income in the constructed income variables. 4  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 47 
All workers were asked whether they had a second occupation. If so, income from it was 
examined in the same way as that from the main occupation. The questionnaire had no 
questions about additional occupations. 
An interesting feature of the EPHPM is that for those who did not work “last week” but did 
work before, the characteristics of the last occupation were surveyed. These included the 
monetary earnings of wage workers (if they had any) “last month”, and of employers and the self-
employed in the “last six months” (again, they were asked to estimate a monthly average). For 
this set of “workers who were not working”, in-kind earnings were not surveyed, and no 
distinction was made between agricultural and non-agricultural producers. 
2.2  NON-LABOUR INCOME 
The reference period for non-labour income in the May 2007 EPHPM was the “last three 
months” (total earnings, not monthly average). All non-labour income components are 
described below, following the order in which they appeared on the questionnaire. The 
definitions are from the EPHPM interviewer’s manual (INE, 2007). 
The first category of non-labour income was pensions. Pensions were divided into two 
types: retirement pensions (jubilación) and those received because of accidents, injuries, 
physical or mental impairments, or sickness (pensión). No distinction was made between 
private and state-provided pensions.  
The second category was that of private transfers from the following sources: monetary 
and in-kind remittances from people living abroad (remesas); monetary and in-kind transfers 
from relatives living in other households in Honduras (ayudas familiares); monetary and in-
kind transfers from non-relatives (ayudas particulares); and alimony (pensión por divorcio). 
The third category was that of capital earnings from two sources: rents (alquileres) and 
interest (intereses bancarios).  
Income from pensions, private transfers and capital earnings could be recorded in 
lempiras or US dollars, except for alimony, which could only be in lempiras. 
The fourth category of non-labour income consisted mainly of government transfers. 
The first component was that of discounts for senior citizens (descuentos por la tercera 
edad). These are discounts that people aged 60 or more are entitled to in transport, public 
services and healthcare costs (it is not clear whether the government actually pays for 
these discounts). 
Two components were related to electricity consumption: a subsidy to households 
consuming less than 300 kWh/month (Subsidio de la ENEE); and Bono 80, a variable cash 
transfer of up to L$ 100 from the national electricity company (ENEE) to households with a low 
level of energy consumption. 
The remaining transfers were disaggregated into five components: (i) cash transfers to  
the elderly, single mothers and students through the Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF);  
(ii) school lunch for children in public schools (in-kind, merienda escolar); (iii) in-kind transfers  
to poor primary and secondary students through the PRAF (Bolsón PRAF); (iv) monetary 
scholarships provided by the government or private institutions (becas); and (v) other cash 
transfers (otros bonos). The latter two categories could be in lempiras or US dollars, while the 
others could only be in lempiras. Rafael Guerreiro Osório  5 
 
All remaining sources of non-labour income that could not be grouped into one of the 
above categories could still be recorded as other income (otros). 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine whether the source of some of these  
non-labour income components is the government or private institutions, such as non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). That is why the analysis of poverty impacts below focuses 
on those components that undoubtedly consist wholly of government transfers. These are the 
ENEE transfers related to electricity consumption, PRAF transfers and school lunch. One 
comment about this latter component: it is a somewhat unusual practice to estimate the 
monetary value of the lunch given to children in public schools and to consider it as  
non-labour income. Nonetheless, this paper will respect and adhere to the practice. 
3  METHODOLOGY 
The main aim of this paper is to gauge the effects of Honduran government transfers on 
income poverty. To that end it adopts a very simple methodology. 
The income indicator is per capita monthly household income. Whenever the word 
“income” is used without qualifiers here, it refers to per capita household income.  
There is a debate on the need to adjust income for intra-household economies of scale and 
equivalences4 but in Honduras, as in most Latin American countries, such adjustments are not 
usually made—either because of a lack of good consumption and spending data or because of 
tradition. The official poverty indicators used in the SIERP are based on per capita household 
income, which this paper therefore uses in order to give poverty estimates that are comparable 
to the others produced in Honduras. 
The analysis begins with a description of the weight of each income component in the 
national average and its concentration relative to total income distribution. These statistics 
allow a standard component decomposition of the Gini index (Kakwani, 1980), so as to 
gauge how government transfers, as well as other income components, interact to 
produce income inequality. 
The next step is to assess the impact of government transfers on income distribution,  
net of those transfers, so as to evaluate how well the poorest Hondurans are reached by cash 
and in-kind transfers. 
After the targeting assessment, the paper presents the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) 
poverty measures—the headcount ratio, the average normalised poverty gap (which measures 
the intensity of poverty) and the severity of poverty indicators—for the income distribution, 
net of transfers. Each transfer is then progressively added, and the poverty measures are 
recalculated to gauge the transfers’ impact on poverty. Following the presentation of the 
indicators, the paper speculates about the amount of resources that would be needed to 
eradicate poverty in Honduras, given the current levels of income deprivation and inequality. 
We then move on to some counterfactual simulations with a view to investigating 
whether, given the observed transfer amounts, improvements in targeting would lead to  
a greater degree of poverty reduction. Three simulations are conducted. In the first and  
second of them, all transfers are distributed according to the incidence of the better targeted 
transfers—school lunch and the PRAF cash transfer. In the third simulation, all transfers are 
distributed as though they had the incidence curve of the Mexican CCT programme 6  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 47 
(Oportunidades), which is deemed to have good targeting (Soares et al, 2007). To reproduce 
the incidence curves of each reference transfer for the other transfers, we use the share of the 
reference transfer accruing to each hundredth of the income distribution, net of transfers. 
Finally we conduct two simulations in which the total amount transferred is progressively 
increased until poverty is eradicated. In the fourth simulation the extra amount is distributed 
according to the incidence of the school lunch, and in the fifth according to the incidence 
curve of the Mexican CCT programme. 
The official Honduran poverty lines are used for poverty estimates. These poverty lines  
are based on the average monetary value of a basic basket that includes the amount of food 
needed to meet caloric requirements, as well as some other basic goods. At the time of writing, 
the official poverty lines for May 2007 were not yet available, and thus we adjusted the 
September 2006 lines (L$ 1,814.73 for urban areas and L$ 915.37 for rural areas) using the 
national consumer price index as issued by the Central Bank. This gave the following 
thresholds: L$ 1,901.81 (US$ 100) for urban areas and L$ 959.29 (US$ 50) for rural areas. 
We will not here reproduce the formulas for the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke poverty 
measures or the Gini index and its decomposition by income components. These are widely 
known and are presented in all guides to income distribution analysis, such as Cowell (2000) 
and Lambert (2001). 
4  RESULTS 
The data in Table 1 show that, as elsewhere, in Honduras the main source of income is labour, 
which accounts for about four-fifths of total income. Since the concentration indices of labour 
and non-labour income are almost the same, the contribution of each of them to inequality, as 
measured by the Gini index, is almost equal to their weight in the national income average. 
The Gini index is the concentration index of total income, which is presented in the bottom 
row of Table 1. It reveals that observed income inequality in Honduras is 56.7 per cent of 
maximum possible inequality, which would be a circumstance in which only one Honduran 
had all income.5 
The most important components of non-labour income are international remittances 
(mainly sent by Hondurans who emigrated to the United States) and within-country private 
transfers from relatives or non-relatives (other households or institutions). Together, these 
three components account for 17 per cent of total income, and 78 per cent of non-labour 
income. Their concentration indices are positive, indicating that this sort of income mainly 
accrues to the relatively richer strata of Honduran society. Remittances are more concentrated 
than transfers from relatives, which are more concentrated than transfers from non-relatives. 
All remaining components have a small weight in the national average, and they make 
little contribution to total inequality. With the exception of the government transfers (the 
italicised components in the lower rows), income components are highly concentrated among 
the relatively rich. Rafael Guerreiro Osório  7 
 
TABLE 1 
Income Components: Average, Weight, Concentration and Contribution to Total Inequality. 












Total  labour  1429.45 78.5%  0.568 78.6% 
Rents  (alquileres)  21.98 1.2%  0.806 1.7% 
Capital earnings (intereses bancarios)  1.86 0.1%  0.778 0.1% 
International remittances (remesas del exterior)  194.27 10.7%  0.620 11.7% 
Private transfers, from relatives (ayudas familiares)  102.81 5.6%  0.429 4.3% 
Private transfers, from non-relatives (ayudas 
particulares) 
7.88 0.4%  0.350 0.3% 
Alimony (pensión por divorcio)  1.60 0.1%  0.655 0.1% 
Retirement pensions (jubilación)  23.05 1.3%  0.819 1.8% 
Pensions (pensión)  3.73 0.2%  0.782 0.3% 
Old-age discounts (descuentos por la tercera edad)  0.55 0.0%  0.709 0.0% 
Other cash transfers (otros bonos)  1.63 0.1%  0.598 0.1% 
Scholarships (becas)  2.89 0.2%  0.663 0.2% 
Other non-labour income (otros)  12.26 0.7%  0.837 1.0% 
Electricity subsidy (Subsidio de la ENEE)   0.65  0.0%  0.283  0.0% 
Electricity cash transfer (Bono 80 - ENEE)   3.68  0.2%  0.220  0.1% 
PRAF - cash transfer (Bonos del PRAF)  0.12  0.0%  -0.085  0.0% 
PRAF - in-kind transfer (Bolsón del PRAF)  0.03  0.0%  -0.069  0.0% 
School lunch (merienda escolar)  12.78  0.7%  -0.234  -0.3% 
Total  non-labour  391.78 21.5%  0.564 21.4% 
Total income (labour + non-labour)  1821.22  100.0%  0.567  100.0% 
Source: INE, Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EPHPM), May 2007. 
 
Together, the government transfers amount to 0.9 per cent of total income. At first sight 
this might seem little, but in fact it is not. In Brazil and Mexico, income from the large CCT 
programmes—Bolsa Família and Oportunidades—amount to 0.5 per cent of total income, 
while transfers in the Chilean program Chile Solidário amount to only 0.01 per cent (Soares et 
al, 2007). Of course this is not a strict comparison, because in the other countries the total 
amount refers only to the CCT programmes. If we do not consider school lunch, the Honduran 
transfers amount to 0.2 per cent of total income. 
The concentration of government transfers related to energy consumption is positive, 
indicating that they are concentrated among the relatively rich. But they are not as 
concentrated as the other non-labour income components: they have the lowest 
concentration indices of all the positively concentrated non-labour income components. 
The PRAF transfers are negatively concentrated, which means that they mostly accrue to 
the relatively poor. Nonetheless, the indices are very close to zero, indicating that they 
contribute little to a reduction in inequality. The most negatively concentrated transfer is 
school lunch. 
The impact of these five transfers on total inequality is very slight—indeed, almost 
negligible. Only school lunch, which accounts for the bulk of government transfers, makes only 8  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 47 
a small contribution to reducing total inequality, given its greater weight in the national 
average and its greater concentration among the poorer segments of the income distribution. 
A word of caution on the interpretation of this inequality decomposition: school lunch helps 
reduce inequality, but it cannot be said that inequality would be 0.3 per cent greater if this 
component did not exist. In such a case, total inequality and all other concentration indices 
would change, but we cannot determine how much from this decomposition alone. 
Another aspect of the Honduran income distribution shown in Table 1 deserves to be 
highlighted. Average income in Honduras is low; it is even below the urban poverty line. Thus 
it cannot be said that positively concentrated transfers, such as those related to electricity 
consumption, do not reach the poor. A significant proportion of relatively rich Hondurans are 
poor, since the income of more than half the population is below the poverty line. It can only 
be said that these transfers are not reaching the extremely poor. 
This matter is better understood by examining the incidence curves of the government 
transfers on the income distribution, net of these transfers, as represented in Figure 1. The 
PRAF cash transfer is the one that most successfully reaches poorer Hondurans: 20 per cent of 
the amount transferred goes to the poorest 5 per cent, although from the 10 per cent poorest 
onwards its targeting performance is somewhat erratic. At the average national income6 
(marked by the thick vertical line at the 73rd hundredth), 78 per cent of the PRAF cash transfer 
was distributed. 
The PRAF in-kind transfer performs less well in reaching the extremely poor, but 88 per 
cent of it goes to the poorest 73 per cent. The poorest 40 per cent receive 43 per cent of it, 
compared to the 60 per cent they receive of the PRAF cash transfer and school lunch. 
School lunch has the best targeting performance across the distribution. Although it too 
does not reach the extremely poor as well as the PRAF cash transfer, it performs similarly at 
some points of the distribution and much better in others. Some 89 per cent of it goes to 
people with below-average income. 
The electricity subsidy and cash transfer have the worst targeting. The poorest 40 per cent 
receive only about 21–22 per cent of them. 
How do these government transfers affect poverty levels? Table 2 provides the answer. 
The first row gives the poverty levels that would prevail if there were no government transfers. 
The poverty indicators should be read as follows. If the transfers did not exist, 64 per cent of 
Hondurans would be poor (the poverty headcount ratio) and the average distance of the 
income of the poor to the poverty lines would be 32 per cent of the poverty lines (the intensity 
of poverty). The severity of poverty indicator does not have a straightforward interpretation 
(since it includes a measure of the inequality of the distribution of the poor’s income among 
the poor) but its level would be 0.2046. 
The PRAF in-kind transfer, the least significant transfer component, has a negligible 
impact on the three poverty indicators. The PRAF cash transfer brings about a small reduction 
in the headcount ratio and in the intensity of poverty. Its effect on the severity of poverty, 
however, is double its effect on the other indicators—signifying that it makes the poor less 
unequal in their income deprivation. The two PRAF transfers are those that have the least 
impact on poverty. 
 Rafael Guerreiro Osório  9 
 
FIGURE 1 
Incidence of Transfers per Hundredths of the Net Income Distribution. Honduras, May 2007 
 
 
Source: INE, Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EPHPM), May 2007. 
 
TABLE 2 




Intensity (P1)  Severity (P2) 
Value  % change  Value  % change  Value  % change 
Net of transfers  64.07% ...  0.3241 ...  0.2046  ... 
+PRAF in-kind transfer (Bolsón del PRAF) 64.07%  0.00%  0.3241  -0.01%  0.2046  -0.01% 
+PRAF cash transfer (Bonos del PRAF) 64.06%  -0.02%  0.3240  -0.02%  0.2045  -0.04% 
+Electricity subsidy (Subsidio de la ENEE)   64.03%  -0.05%  0.3238  -0.07%  0.2044  -0.09% 
+Electricity cash transfer (Bono 80 - ENEE)   63.91%  -0.19%  0.3224  -0.43%  0.2032  -0.58% 
+School lunch (merienda escolar) 63.53%  -0.59%  0.3134  -2.80%  0.1934  -4.79% 
Total income  63.53%  -0.84%  0.3134  -3.31%  0.1934  -5.47% 
Source: INE, Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EPHPM), May 2007. 
 
Although they are more concentrated on the relatively rich and are targeted less well, 
each of the transfers tied to low electricity consumption has a greater impact on poverty than 
the two PRAF transfers together. Nonetheless, they have only a very small impact on all 
poverty indicators. Even with regard to the most sensitive indicator, the severity of poverty,  
the fall caused by these transfers is less than 1 per cent. 10  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 47 
As one would expect from the other results presented so far, school lunch is the 
government transfer that has the most impact on poverty. It reduces the intensity of poverty 
by almost 3 per cent and the severity of poverty by almost 5 per cent. 
According to the EPHPM data,7 all transfers together amount to L$ 130 million per 
month8 (about US$ 7 million). Nonetheless, they are responsible for a meagre reduction  
of less than 1 per cent of the headcount, and therefore are not helping the poor to escape 
poverty. But they do help alleviate poverty, reducing its intensity by 3 per cent. Their 
greatest impact is on the severity of poverty, which the transfers cause to fall by a little  
more than 5 per cent. 
Given the observed poverty gap after government transfers, 22 per cent of total income 
would still have to be redistributed to the poor in order to eradicate poverty in Honduras.  
In absolute figures, this would amount to about L$ 3 billion (US$ 161 million) per month.  
The average cash transfer would have to be about L$ 641 (US$ 34) per month to 4.7 million 
poor Hondurans. 
In an optimistic scenario, poverty in Honduras could be eradicated through redistribution. 
The “surplus” income of Hondurans above the poverty line amounts to 46 per cent of total 
income. In other words, the “affluence gap” is more than twice the poverty gap. If heavy 
taxation and perfect targeting could channel 30 per cent of the income of non-poor 
Hondurans to the poor, poverty could be eliminated. 
Since the level of income inequality is very high in Honduras, a “Robin Hood” taxation 
strategy would secure all the resources needed to eradicate poverty by limiting the highest 
income to about L$ 6,715 (US$ 353) per month and collecting everything that exceeds this 
threshold. This would affect only the 3.5 per cent richest Hondurans, and after tax they would 
still have an income 3.5 times higher than the urban poverty line, and seven times higher than 
the rural poverty line. 
Since perfect targeting is impossible in practical terms, and since the richest Hondurans 
would surely resist such a radical poverty reduction plan, it is very unlikely that Honduras will 
be able to eradicate poverty through redistribution alone. Setting aside optimistic scenarios, if 
redistribution policies in Honduras succeed in alleviating poverty, preferably extreme poverty, 
this can already be judged a great accomplishment. 
Even if it is not feasible to eradicate poverty in Honduras through transfers, there is room 
to speculate as to whether these transfers could have a greater impact on poverty, and 
especially on poverty alleviation. To investigate this matter, we conducted some 
counterfactual simulations. 
The results of the first simulation are presented in Table 3. In this simulation, first we 
gauge the impact of school lunch on the distribution, net of all transfers. The results differ 
slightly from those in Table 2, because the order in which the components are added matters. 
After that, we calculate the poverty measures for the distribution including school lunch, but 
net of the remaining transfers. The simulation then consists of distributing the total amount of 
the PRAF and ENEE transfers as though they were targeted in the same way as school lunch, 
making their incidence curves equal (see Figure 1). Rafael Guerreiro Osório  11 
 
In this simulation, it is as though the transfers were given together with school lunch. 
Hence, if the PRAF and ENEE transfers were distributed following the incidence of school 
lunch, the reduction in the headcount ratio would be slightly smaller than observed. But the 
decline in the intensity and severity of poverty would be greater in the counterfactual 
distribution—though not much greater, as seen in the bottom row of Table 3. 
TABLE 3 
Impact of Transfers on Poverty—Counterfactual: All Transfers with the Incidence of School 
Lunch. Honduras, May 2007 
Income 
Headcount ratio (P0)  Intensity (P1)  Severity (P2) 
Value  % change  Value  % change  Value  % change 
Net of transfers  64.07%  ...  0.3241  ...  0.2046  ... 
+School lunch (merienda escolar) 63.67%  -0.63%  0.3151  -2.79%  0.1949  -4.78% 
+PRAF/ENEE w/ incidence of school lunch  63.55%  -0.18%  0.3119  -1.01%  0.1914  -1.78% 
Total income (counterfactual distribution)  63.55%  -0.81%  0.3119  -3.77%  0.1914  -6.48% 
Observed relative to counterfactual 
distribution 
63.53% -0.02%  0.3134  0.48%  0.1934 1.07% 
Source: INE, Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EPHPM), May 2007. 
 
Figure 1 shows that the targeting performance of the PRAF cash transfer is similar to that 
of school lunch, though it is better targeted among the extremely poor. Hence the second 
simulation consisted of equalising the incidence curves of the school lunch, in-kind PRAF and 
ENEE transfers with that of the PRAF cash transfer. This simulation tells us what would happen 
to poverty if these other transfers ended and the amount transferred by them was used to 
increase the value of the PRAF cash transfer. The results are presented in Table 4. 
As in Table 2, adding the PRAF cash transfer to the distribution, net of all transfers, has 
almost no impact on any of the poverty indicators. When we add the remaining transfers 
according to the incidence of the PRAF cash transfers, the results are slightly different from the 
previous simulation. The headcount ratio of the counterfactual distribution is a little smaller 
than that observed, and both the intensity and severity of poverty are less than observed.  
If all transfers were distributed as the PRAF cash transfer, however, there would be less  
poverty alleviation than if they were distributed with the incidence of school lunch. These 
results suggest that although the PRAF cash transfer performs better than others at the very 
bottom of the income distribution, part of it is accruing to the least poor, whose income is 
closer to the poverty lines. 
In both simulated scenarios, however, the impact on poverty would differ little from what is 
observed. Hence the final simulation consists of considering what would happen if the incidence 
of all these five government transfers were as good as that of the CCTs of Brazil, Mexico or Chile. 
Since the targeting performances of these programmes are similar (Soares et al, 2007), we chose 
the Mexican CCT for this exercise. We distributed the total amount transferred by the 
government in Honduras according to the incidence curve of Oportunidades, as presented by 
Soares et al (2007). Table 5 presents the results . 12  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 47 
TABLE 4 
Impact of Transfers on Poverty—Counterfactual: All Transfers with the Incidence of PRAF Cash 
Transfer. Honduras, May 2007 
Income 
Headcount ratio (P0)  Intensity (P1)  Severity (P2) 
Value  % change  Value  % change  Value  % change 
Net of transfers  64.07%  ...  0.3241  ...  0.2046  ... 
+PRAF cash transfer (Bonos del PRAF)  64.06%  -0.02% 0.3240  -0.02% 0.2046  -0.04% 
+PRAF in-kind/ENEE/school lunch w/ 
incidence of PRAF cash 
63.49%  -0.89% 0.3131  -3.37% 0.1929  -5.69% 
Total income (counterfactual distribution)  63.49%  -0.91%  0.3131  -3.39%  0.1929  -5.72% 
Observed relative to counterfactual 
distribution 
63.53%  0.07% 0.3134  0.09% 0.1934  0.27% 
Source: INE, Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EPHPM), May 2007. 
 
TABLE 5 
Impact of Transfers on Poverty—Counterfactual: All Transfers with the Incidence of Mexican 
Conditional Cash Transfer. Honduras, May 2007 
Income 
Headcount ratio (P0)  Intensity (P1)  Severity (P2) 
Value  % change  Value  % change  Value  % change 
Net of transfers  64.07%  ...  0.3241  ...  0.2046  ... 
+All transfers w/ incidence of Mexican CCT  63.90%  -0.26% 0.3091  -4.61% 0.1849  -9.65% 
Observed relative to counterfactual 
distribution 
63.53%  -0.58% 0.3134  1.37% 0.1934  4.62% 
Sources: INE, Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EPHPM), May 2007; Soares et al (2007). 
 
Table 5 shows, on the one hand, that the impact on the headcount ratio would be even 
smaller than in previous simulations. On the other hand, the impact on the intensity and 
severity of poverty would be significantly greater. If all government transfers were distributed 
among Hondurans as the Mexican CCT was distributed among Mexicans, they would lower the 
intensity of poverty of the net distribution by almost 5 per cent, and the severity of poverty by 
almost 10 per cent. The observed severity of poverty measure is almost 5 per cent greater than 
it would be under this scenario. 
These three simulations indicate that if the amount transferred is kept at 0.9 per cent of 
total income, its impact on poverty will be small even if targeting improves significantly. This is 
unsurprising, since the poverty gap is 22 per cent of total income. Thus, if Honduran society 
wants government transfers to have substantial effects on poverty, the amounts transferred 
must increase. The question, then, is by how much should they grow? 
To answer this question we conducted two additional simulations. In both, we departed 
from observed poverty levels (that is, including the amounts already transferred) and we 
distributed more income in 1 per cent increments of total income. In other words, first we 
distributed 1 per cent, than 2 per cent, 3 percent and so forth, until we reached the percentage 
of total income that would have to be distributed to eradicate poverty. In one of the 
simulations the extra income was distributed in line with the incidence curve of school lunch, 
and in the other it was allocated according to the incidence curve of the Mexican CCT. The 
results are presented in Figures 2 and 3. Rafael Guerreiro Osório  13 
 
FIGURE 2 
Impact of Transfers on Poverty—Counterfactual: Increasing Total Amount of Transfers with the 
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Source: INE, Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EPHPM), May 2007. 
 
The first interesting result of these simulations is that the total amount of extra income 
that would have to be distributed in order to eradicate poverty is smaller if the transfers 
followed the incidence curve of school lunch than if they followed that of the Mexican CCT: 
103 per cent of total income, against 292 per cent. If 70 per cent of total income were 
distributed as school lunch is distributed, poverty would be a residual phenomenon in 
Honduras. But if this same 70 per cent were distributed as the Mexican CCT is distributed, 16 
per cent of Hondurans would still be poor—though the poverty would be “light” because their 
incomes would be very close to the poverty lines. 
Although this result seems counterintuitive, it is explained by the fact that the Mexican 
CCT accrues mostly to the extremely poor, while school lunch is more uniformly distributed 
among all the poor. Poverty levels in Mexico are much lower than in Honduras, and the 
Mexican CCT is designed to reach extremely poor Mexicans: its incidence curve mirrors its 
goals. At 70 per cent of total income, the extremely poor would cross the poverty line, but 
some of the least and intermediate poor would not. 
The percentage of total income needed to eradicate poverty under both scenarios is much 
greater than the 22 per cent required to close the poverty gap, because targeting is imperfect 
under both of them. There are leakages to the non-poor, and the share of transfers received by 
each of the poor is not sufficiently balanced to bring their incomes to the poverty lines.  
It is obviously unfeasible to increase the transfer size to 70 per cent of total income. It is 
doubtful that even smaller increases, such as to 20 per cent of total income, are viable. But 
what would happen in both scenarios if the extra transfers were in the range of between 1 and 
20 per cent of total income? 14  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 47 
FIGURE 3 
Impact of Transfers on Poverty—Counterfactual: Increasing Total Amount of Transfers with the 
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Sources: INE, Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EPHPM), May 2007; Soares et al (2007). 
 
Up to 10 per cent of total income, the scenario in which the extra amount is distributed in 
the same manner as school lunch can bring about a steeper decline in the headcount ratio. 
Between 10 and 20 per cent of total income, however, the decline in the headcount ratio is 
steeper in the scenario presented in Figure 3. Again, this is because, with the school-lunch 
incidence, a large part of the transfers accrues to the poor whose income is closer to the 
poverty lines. When the amount transferred increases, the least poor cross the poverty 
threshold and even move far from it. With the Mexican CCT incidence, the least poor receive 
less and thus more people approach the poverty lines. Or, when the amount transferred is 
more than 10 per cent of total income, more people are able to pass the poverty thresholds. 
Does this mean that if the amount transferred could only increase to less than 10 per cent 
of total income, the school-lunch targeting is preferable to that of the Mexican CCT? The 
answer is: yes, if you only care about the headcount ratio; no, if you care about the intensity 
and severity of poverty. These other poverty measures decline more steeply for smaller transfer 
values distributed with the incidence of the Mexican CCT. 
To highlight the differences, Figure 4 presents a more detailed view of the data from 
Figures 2 and 3 for transfers of up to 10 per cent of total income. The unit of the horizontal axis 
has been changed from percentage of total income to millions of US dollars, but the round 
markers are at 0, 1, 2, 3 per cent of total income and so forth. One per cent of total income is 
around L$ 137 million, a little more than US$ 7 million. Rafael Guerreiro Osório  15 
 
FIGURE 4 
Detailed Comparison of Figures 2 and 3. Honduras, May 2007 
 
 
Sources: INE, Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EPHPM), May 2007; Soares et al (2007). 
 
Figure 4 reveals that in the range of feasible transfers, a targeting strategy that focuses on 
the extremely poor, here represented by the incidence of the Mexican CCT, has greater 
poverty-alleviation effects. Although transfers in this range, distributed as school lunch is 
distributed, would have a greater impact on the headcount ratio, clearly they would not have 
such an impact on the intensity and severity of poverty. They would take the least poor out of 
poverty but the rest of the poor, particularly the extremely poor, would not experience as 
much alleviation as they could if their poverty were tackled first. 
5  CONCLUSIONS 
Honduras is not only a low-income country, but also a very unequal one. The level of 
inequality is high in the distribution of almost all income components, and average per 
capita household income is lower than the urban poverty line. Because of the combination  
of a high level of inequality and low average income, more than half the population are poor 
according to official Honduran poverty lines. Hence, even some of the richer half of the 
Honduran population are poor, and the level of inequality among the poor is also very high. 
As in other Latin American countries, the Honduran state does not efficiently play its role in 
counteracting the inequalities that arise from the labour market through transfers and 
services for the poorer segments of the population. 
It is often thought that low-income countries are unable to eradicate poverty using their 
own resources, because the “surplus” income of those above the poverty lines is not enough to 
close the poverty gap. This is not the case in Honduras. Given the high level of inequality, the 
“affluence gap” (that is, non-poor Hondurans’ income above the poverty lines) is more than 16  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 47 
twice the poverty gap. At least theoretically, therefore, it is possible to eradicate poverty 
through redistribution. This paper has shown that in a very optimistic hypothetical scenario, 
with “Robin Hood” taxation and perfect targeting, poverty could be eradicated simply by 
making the 3.5 per cent richest Hondurans less rich. Although we recognise that this is not 
feasible in the real world for several reasons, it is a fact that should be kept in mind because it 
suggests that if more effort is made to fight poverty, Honduran society can achieve greater 
poverty reduction and alleviation. 
Given the limitations of the data source, we were unable to evaluate the impact of all 
government transfers on poverty. But we have shown that some non-labour income that 
consists partly of government transfers—such as pensions, old-age discounts and 
scholarships—are even more concentrated on richer Hondurans than labour earnings. 
It is also clear that the least poor, as well as those Hondurans who are not poor but are not 
far above the poverty lines, have their own strategies to cope with low income, given the 
significant share of non-labour income that consists of international remittances and private 
transfers. But extremely poor Hondurans are not benefiting from such strategies because these 
income components accrue mostly to the relatively rich. 
We evaluated the incidence and impact of some major government transfers on poverty, 
namely: the cash and in-kind transfers of the PRAF; the transfers of the national electricity 
company, ENEE, which are conditional on low electricity consumption; and the school lunch 
given to students at public schools—the value of which, somewhat unusually, is estimated and 
counted as non-labour income. Let us review what we have learned about the impact of each 
of these transfers on poverty. 
Together, the cash (Bonos) and in-kind (Bolsón) PRAF transfers have almost no impact on 
poverty. Considering the income distribution including transfers, we have seen that their 
concentration indices are negative but very small, meaning that they make little contribution 
to reducing inequality. Looking at the income distribution net of transfers, with a view to 
assessing their incidence, we noted that they do reach the poor (the PRAF cash transfer 
performs better than the in-kind transfer in this regard) but they do so rather uniformly. In 
other words, these transfers are not taking full account of the inequality of income deprivation 
among the poor. 
But the main reason why the PRAF transfers have a negligible impact on poverty is that 
the amount transferred is very small. This was confirmed by the counterfactual simulation in 
which we distributed all other government transfers as the PRAF cash transfer was distributed. 
Under this scenario, which is equivalent to increasing the amount transferred by PRAF from 
less than 0.1 per cent to 0.9 per cent of total income, the impacts on poverty would be greater 
than the observed impact of all transfers. 
The ENEE transfers (Subsidio and Bono 80) have a very different profile from those of the 
PRAF. They accrue mostly to the relatively rich, though they are the least concentrated of the 
positively concentrated income components. Looking at their incidence we found that they do 
reach the poor, but that they are more successful in reaching the least poor and they have the 
most leakage to the non-poor population of all the government transfers examined here. 
Since the amount of these transfers is considerably larger, however, they have a more 
significant impact on poverty than the PRAF transfers. The simulations showed that if these 
transfers were used to increase the amount transferred by PRAF instead of being given to Rafael Guerreiro Osório  17 
 
households with low electricity consumption, or even if they were distributed with the same 
incidence as school lunch, the impact of government transfers on poverty could be greater. 
Indeed, since the incidence of school lunch is equivalent to that of the PRAF cash transfer, and 
since the PRAF transfers have almost no impact because of their size, the differences between 
poverty in the simulated scenarios—in which the total amount transferred was fixed—and 
observed poverty were almost entirely due to the reallocation of ENEE transfers. 
Of all income components, school lunch was undoubtedly the most pro-poor, being the 
most negatively concentrated. Its incidence revealed that it was the most consistently 
targeted government transfer, given that it reached the extremely poor almost as well as  
the PRAF cash transfer, but had considerably lower leakage to the non-poor. As the most 
pro-poor transfer whose amount was the largest among the transfers examined, it had the 
greatest impact on poverty. 
Although it is debatable whether school lunch should have its monetary value estimated 
and counted as non-labour income, the fact that it is the most important government transfer 
for poverty alleviation yields some interesting insights. The simulation with a fixed amount and 
the incidence of a Honduran government transfer as reference that most reduced the intensity 
and severity of poverty was that which distributed all government transfers with the incidence 
of school lunch. Thus a cash transfer conditional on school attendance, without any kind of 
means testing, given to all families with children in the Honduran public education system, and 
transferring 0.9 per cent of total income, could have greater impacts on the intensity and 
severity of poverty than all the examined government transfers together. 
The PRAF cash transfer and school lunch were the best-targeted transfers examined. We 
noted, however, that they were rather uniformly distributed among the poor and that the 
PRAF incidence could bring about a slightly bigger reduction in the headcount ratio—albeit 
with less impact on the intensity and severity of poverty because part of it goes to the least 
poor who are able to cross the poverty thresholds by receiving small transfers. 
This prompted us to carry out a simulation in which the government transfers were 
distributed with improved targeting. To that end, we distributed these transfers as those of the 
CCT programme Oportunidades are distributed in Mexico. This simulation showed that if there 
were the option of prioritising the extremely poor, given the amount transferred in Honduras, 
there could be a smaller reduction in the poverty headcount ratio but a greater impact on the 
intensity and severity of poverty. This is because a greater share of the transfers would go to 
the extremely poor, narrowing the gap between their incomes and the poverty lines, though 
not enabling them to cross those lines. 
Then we went further and simulated what could happen to the poverty indicators if the 
amounts transferred were increased under two targeting scenarios: one in which the transfers 
are more uniformly distributed among the poor, represented by the incidence of school lunch; 
and the other in which the extremely poor are prioritised, represented by the incidence of 
Oportunidades. We discovered that in the range of feasible increases, less than 10 per cent of 
total income, the targeting of school lunch (similar to that of the PRAF cash transfer) would 
bring about a greater reduction in of the headcount ratio but smaller reductions in the 
intensity and severity of poverty. 18  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 47 
This leads us to the choices that must be made by a society that wants to tackle poverty 
in a context of limited resources. Honduran society can give priority to reducing the 
headcount ratio by providing small transfers to all the poor, enabling the least poor to cross 
the poverty lines but leaving the extremely poor almost untouched in their income 
deprivation. Or it can give priority to reducing the intensity and severity of poverty by 
concentrating its efforts and transfers on the extremely poor, so as to make their poverty a 
lighter burden and the poor less unequal. Rafael Guerreiro Osório  19 
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NOTES 
 
1. Honduras (2008). 
2. This has been widely discussed recently in Honduran public opinion and many articles on the matter have 
appeared in major newspapers such as El Heraldo, La Tribuna and La Prensa.  
3. Although the livestock section of the questionnaire says that the information covers the “last 12 months”, the 
interviewer’s manual (INE, 2007) for the May 2007 round says that for livestock the reference period should be the 
“last three months”. Hence the correct reference period is uncertain. This a minor issue, however, because income 
from sales of livestock and their by-products has almost no weight in average labour income, and because 
constructed variables will be used. 
4. See Cowell and Mercader-Prats (1999) for an overview of this debate. 
5. This interpretation of the Gini index is based on its relationship with the Lorenz curve. In this regard  
see Cowell (2000) and Lambert (2001). 
6. The average income of the distribution with transfers, shown in the bottom row of Table 1. 
7. As the following figures are from a household survey, they might not match those from the administrative 
records of the Honduran government. 
8. For the sake of comparison, Brazilian cash transfer programmes (Vale-Gás, Bolsa-Escola, Bolsa-Alimentação, 
Cartão-Alimentação and Bolsa-Família) transferred the equivalent of US$ 359 million to beneficiaries in May 2007 
(data from the registry of the Brazilian Ministry for Social Development, available at <http://www.mds.gov.br>). International Poverty Centre
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